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USE IMMUNITY AND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT: MAYBE THE SECOND
CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE REMAINED
SILENT
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 1 has
been characterized as "a reflection of our common conscience."2 To
fulfill the governmental objective of obtaining pertinent evidence
without offending the societal interest in the inviolability of the
fifth amendment privilege, Congress adopted immunity statutes.3
' U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id.
2 E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 73 (1955). Dean Griswold stated that the
fifth amendment represents society's attempt to promote "the essential importance and dignity of the individual." Id. at 74. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57
(1964), Justice Goldberg provided an extensive discussion of the policies which undergird
the privilege:
[The right against self-incrimination] reflects many of our fundamental values
and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime
to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear
that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load," our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may
lead a private life," our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization
that the privilege, while sometimes a "shelter to the guilty" is often a protection
to the innocent."
Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
Professor Berger has suggested the following three policy objectives as justification for
the continued life of the fifth amendment: limitation on the enforcement powers of the
state; elimination of the cruelty involved in self-accusation; and promotion of privacy and
the right to be left alone. See M. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH 44 (1980); see also M. MELTZER, THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 16 (1972) (two reasons for inviolability of fifth amendment privilege: provides a check on state authority; promotes privacy rights of individuals).
3 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1972). In Kastigar,Justice Powell stated that immunity statutes are not inconsistent with the policies which underlie the
fifth amendment privilege: "Rather, they seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify." Id. In the Supreme Court's first decision upholding a congressional immunity statute,
the Court held that once the grant of immunity has insulated the witness from future prosecution, the witness is duty bound to testify as to the incriminating facts. See Brown v.
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After the Supreme Court rejected an early attempt at granting witnesses limited "use immunity,"4 Congress opted for the more extensive coverage of a "transactional immunity" statute.5 Much to
the chagrin of law enforcement officials and prosecutors, transactional immunity effectively provided witnesses with an "immunity
bath."8 In response to the need for more efficient evidence gathering and prosecutorial procedures in organized crime cases, ConWalker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896). In his renowned treatise on evidence, Dean Wigmore
stated that "[flor more than three centuries it has now been recognized... that the public.
has a right to every man's evidence." 8 WIGMORE ON EvIDENCE § 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940).
The first immunity statute was proposed and enacted in a matter of two days as a
response to an alleged in-house vote selling scandal in which Congress required the testimony of a certain newspaper reporter. See Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts
in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1571
(1963).
" See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892). In Counselman, the Supreme Court held the Immunity Act of 1868 unconstitutional. Id. This statute provided that
any compelled testimony acquired subsequent to the witness' invocation of the fifth amendment privilege could not be used against the witness in a later prosecution. See id. at 56061. The Court determined that the statute did not protect the witness from indirect use of
the compelled testimony which might lead to incriminating evidence against him. See id. at
564. Thus, the Court declared the statute unconstitutional because the protection it afforded the witness was not as extensive as that of the constitutional privilege it was intended to supplant. See id. at 585.
The term "use immunity" refers to a limited grant of immunity where, in exchange for
a witness' self-incriminating testimony, the government is barred from using that testimony
against the witness in a future prosecution. See L. TAYLOR, WITNESS IMMUNITY 79 (1983). In

contrast, the term "use/derivative use immunity" refers to that type of immunity where the
government is barred from using the immunized testimony, either directly or indirectly, in a
future prosecution. See id. Further reference to the term "use immunity" in this Comment
should be deemed to connote "use/derivative use immunity."
5 Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443. The statute provided that "no person shall
be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence." Id. This statute
subsequently passed constitutional muster. See Brown, 161 U.S. at 610.
Transactional immunity provides broader protection to the witness than use immunity

because it bars forever a prosecution for anything incriminating which the witness mentions.
See L. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 75.
6 See M. BERGER, supra note 2, at 70. Prosecutors rarely granted transactional immunity because it provided the witness virtual amnesty, a price the criminal justice system
could not afford. See Note, Federal Witness Immunity Problems and Practices Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 278 (1976). To illustrate the infrequency of
prosecutorial use of these broad transactional immunity statutes, the National Lawyers
Guild compared the number of grants of transactional immunity with the number of grants
of immunity under the present use immunity statute. See id. at 278 n.18 (citing NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD, REPRESENTATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES: A MANUAL
FOR ATTORNEYS 13-52 (1974)). The study revealed that more witnesses were granted immunity within the first ten months of the enactment of the present use immunity statute than

had been granted transactional immunity in the preceding fifty years. Id.
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gress adopted the present use immunity statute. 7 The Supreme
Court subsequently upheld this more streamlined grant of immunity as being coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege. 8 Recently, in United States v. Gallo,9 a divided Second Circuit panel
upheld a defendant's conviction notwithstanding the unauthorized
use of that defendant's prior immunized testimony. 10 The sole consensus which may be gleaned from the two concurring opinions is
that any violation of the defendant's rights constituted harmless
11
error.

In Gallo, the defendant, Julie Miron, had testified under a
grant of statutory use immunity before a grand jury investigating
the activities of former labor official John Cody.' 2 Subsequent to
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1982). Section 6002, the use immunity section, provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary
to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
Id. at § 6002.
Upon consideration of this section of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the
House Judiciary Committee reported that one of its purposes was to enhance "the legal
tools in the evidence-gathering process" in order to counter the increasing influence of organized crime. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1073 [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
' See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). The Kastigar Court stated
that while the Court has zealously protected those values undergirding the fifth amendment,
it also has recognized the need for immunity statutes in order to effectively enforce criminal
laws. See id. at 445-47. The Court held that since 18 U.S.C. § 6002 proscribed the use of
"compelled testimony in any respect," the protection it afforded the witness was as broad as
the scope of the fifth amendment privilege; hence, it provided the government with a constitutional method of compelling testimony. See id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
859 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2428 (1989).
10 See id.
" See id. at 1082-84.
2 Id. at 1079. Miron, the president of several building supply companies, testified as to
his relationship with Cody and Paul Castellano, the putative boss of the Gambino crime
family. Id. Miron testified that his companies had supplied building materials for the construction of homes for Castellano's sons. Id. Miron further testified to a meeting attended
by himself, Cody and Castellano which was called in response to a charge that Miron was
7
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Cody's conviction for labor-racketeering, the FBI inadvertently included several paragraphs of Miron's immunized testimony in an
affidavit supporting an application for an extension and expansion
of a wiretap authorization at the home of reputed mob boss Paul
Castellano."3 Through this wiretap, the government gathered evidence implicating Miron in a labor-racketeering scheme, which evidence eventually led to his conviction.1 4 Miron moved to dismiss
the indictment on the grounds of an improper derivative use of his
prior immunized testimony by the government. 15 The district court
denied the motion on two alternative grounds: first, the grant of
immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 did not apply to crimes committed subsequent to the immunized testimony; 6 and second, even if
the grant of immunity did extend to the crimes in the indictment,
no violation of the defendant's rights had occurred.17 A divided
three judge panel affirmed Miron's conviction.' 8
Writing the lead opinion for the court, Judge Winter stated
that since labor racketeering generally represents a scheme of
ongoing criminal activity, a real and substantial danger existed at
the time of Miron's immunized testimony that he would incriminate himself as to the crimes for which he was ultimately convicted. 9 Rejecting the reasoning of the district court,20 Judge Winovercharging Castellano's sons. See id.
13 Id. at 1080. The application was for an extension of the earlier order and an expansion of the scope of the existing wiretap to cover Hobbs and Taft-Hartley Act violations. Id.

See id. at 1080-81.
United States v. Gallo, 671 F. Supp. 124, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 859 F.2d 1079
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2428 (1989).
1" Id. at 137-38. Judge Weinstein (then Chief Judge of the Eastern District of New
"

16

York) stated that any reading of § 6002 as providing immunity from the use of immunized
testimony in a prosecution for "all future crimes would establish an extraordinary anomaly
in the law of immunity." Id. at 133. Such a construction of the statute would be anomalous
because Congress intended to rid the criminal justice system of grants of transactional immunity. See id.
" Id. at 138. The district court held that Miron's testimony had no effect on the deci-

sion to extend and expand the wiretap, and that the government had successfully proven
the existence of "wholly independent legitimate sources" for the wiretap extension and expansion. Id.
SGallo, 859

F.2d at 1084.
See id. Judge Winter relied on Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), for its
rejection of a rigid chronological test in deciding whether or not the fifth amendment privilege applies. See Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1081-82. The Marchetti Court established a test for the
proper invocation of the fifth amendment privilege which relies on "the substantiality of the
risks of incrimination" rather than a mere "chronological formula." Marchetti, 390 U.S. at
54. Judge Winter distinguished the subsequent case of United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601
(1971), which appeared to turn the tide back toward a chronological test, and held that
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ter thus concluded that the use of the defendant's immunized
testimony in the wiretap application violated both the immunity
statute and the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination. 2 ' He affirmed Miron's conviction, however, on the
grounds that these violations represented harmless error. 2
In his concurring opinion, Judge Van Graafeiland agreed with
Judge Winter that any alleged violation of Miron's rights constituted harmless error, thereby mandating affirmance of the conviction.23 Judge Van Graafeiland argued, however, as an alternative
rationale, that the fifth amendment privilege should not extend to
future criminal acts unrelated to a continuous course of criminal
activity. 24 Judge Van Graafeiland stated that the district court's

findings of fact clearly established that Miron's conviction was not
based on an ongoing course of criminal conduct. 25 He then argued

that the statutory grant of immunity should not be extended to
insulate the defendant's prior immunized testimony when at the
time of compulsion there existed no real or substantial danger of
incrimination as to the prospective criminal acts.26
Marchetti was dispositive on the facts of the present case. See Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1082.
20 Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1081-82.
21 Id. at 1082.
22 See id. at 1082-84. Judge Winter based his harmless constitutional error analysis on
the seminal case of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Chapman Court stated

that for a finding of harmless constitutional error, "the court must be able to declare a belief
that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. Judge
Winter concluded that use of defendant's immunized testimony in the application for the
wiretap extension in no way affected the court's decision to grant such an extension. See
Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1084-85.
22 See Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1084-85 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring).
24 See id. at 1089-90 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has stated
on numerous occasions that there must be an actual threat that a witness' response will be
incriminating in order for the fifth amendment privilege to attach. See, e.g., Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (fifth amendment privilege attaches only if responsive answer could reasonably be thought inculpatory); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600
(1896) (prohibition against self-incrimination assumes that compelled testimony will be incriminatory). Judge Van Graafeiland relied on the requirement of a tangible and reasonable
fear of incrimination and the premise that only an ongoing course of criminal activity could
provide a reasonable fear of incrimination as to future criminal acts. See Gallo, 859 F.2d at
1088 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Quartermain, Drax, 613 F.2d
38, 42-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980)).
22 See Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1089 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring). The district court specifically stated: "[Tihe proof showed that the criminal activity for which [Miron] was convicted began after he testified before the grand jury." United States v. Gallo, 671 F. Supp.
124, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 859 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2428
(1989).
26 See Galo, 859 F.2d at 1088-90 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring). Judge Van Graafei-
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Dissenting, Judge Altimari agreed that a violation of the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights had occurred, for reasons similar to those propounded by Judge Winter,2" but attacked
the majority's harmless error analysis as being deficient for two
reasons. First, the harmless error rule should never be applied to a
fifth amendment violation involving the improper use of prior immunized testimony,2 8 and second, the error in this case tainted all
the evidence against the defendant, thereby negating the possibility of harmlessness. 9 Judge Altimari concluded that the violation
of defendant's rights required reversal of the conviction.3 0
While two of the three judges in Gallo agreed that a constitutional violation had occurred, it is suggested that this agreement
was founded upon an improper reading of Supreme Court precedent and improperly disregarded the district court's findings of
fact. It is submitted that Miron's grant of immunity should not
have protected his testimony from derivative use because the fifth
amendment's protection does not extend to such future criminal
acts. This Comment will suggest that by failing to limit the extent
of the use immunity statute to situations where a proper fifth
amendment claim is advanced, the court has risked stifling the enhanced evidence-gathering purpose of section 6002. This Comment
will further suggest that the Gallo court paradoxically expanded
the scope of the fifth amendment privilege by not properly defining it, while concomitantly derogating the value of said privilege by
subjecting an alleged violation to a harmless error analysis.
SCOPE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE

The guarantee of the fifth amendment privilege extends only
land explored the legislative intent of Congress and concluded that the statute was never
intended to restrict the use of a witness' immunized testimony in a prosecution for a crime
committed subsequent to that testimony. See id. at 1090 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring).
27 Id. at 1094 (Altimari, J., dissenting). Judge Altimari stated that the RICO statute,
under which Miron had been convicted, was aimed at ongoing criminal activities. Id. at 1094
n.1 (Altimari, J., dissenting). Therefore, Miron was subjected to a real and substantial danger that he would incriminate himself at the time of his immunized testimony as to his
future course of criminal conduct. Id. (Altimari, J., dissenting) (citing Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968)).
28 Id. at 1095 (Altimari, J., dissenting). Judge Altimari maintained that neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit had ever allowed a harmless error analysis to be applied
to such a breach of an individual's privilege against self-incrimination. Id. (Altimari, J.,
dissenting).
2'9 See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
30 Id.
(Altimari, J., dissenting).
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to situations which present the witness with a "real and appreciable" fear of self-incrimination.3 1 Absent such fear, the witness may
be compelled to testify.3 2 For years, the Supreme Court steadfastly
ruled that a real and appreciable fear could exist only if the compelled testimony threatened to expose a prior or concurrent criminal act.3 3 The Court ultimately rejected this strict chronological
standard in Marchetti v. United States,3 4 as it held that prospective criminal acts may raise a real and substantial risk of self-incrimination at the time of the compelled testimony. 35 Three years
later, in United States v. Freed,36 the Court restricted this apparent expansion of the fifth amendment privilege. 7 The Freed Court
upheld a statutory scheme whereby the transferror of a firearm
was required to register all such transfers.3 8 The Court denied a
transferee's claim that the requirement of his photograph and fin31 See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (fifth amendment protection "must be confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend
danger from a direct answer"); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (proper
invocation of fifth amendment privilege requires "real danger of legal detriment"); see also
8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2281, at 467 (3d ed. 1940) (absent any possible legal consequences, fifth amendment privilege cannot be invoked).
32 See, e.g., Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 (1956) (once grant of immunity
supplants privilege witness may no longer remain silent); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
600 (1896) (all citizens have a duty to provide their evidence and may not hide behind
invalid fifth amendment claims); see also L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 2 (1978) (absent valid claim of fifth amendment privilege, person obligated to respond to questioning when properly summoned).
'3 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419, 421-23 (1955) (no fifth amendment
claim with respect to federal gambling tax registration statute which was prospective in
nature); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 32 (1953) (privilege "has relation only to
past acts, not to future acts that may or may not be committed").
, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
35 Id. at 53-54. In Marchetti, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the
registration provision of a federal gambling tax statute. Id. at 41. Petitioner claimed that
compliance with the federal law would subject him to prosecution under state prohibitions
on wagering. See id. at 46-47. Since gambling was proscribed by law in forty-nine states, the
Court concluded that the registration requirement posed a substantial threat of self-incrimination. See id. at 44-48. The Court held that the registration requirement improperly forced
the petitioner to reveal his past illegal gambling activities. See id. at 52. Moreover, the
Court held that the statute forced petitioner to incriminate himself as to his intent to gamble in the future. See id. at 53-54. In rejecting the strict chronological standard for applying
the fifth amendment, the Court stated that "it is not mere time to which the law must look,
but the substantiality of the risks of incrimination." Id. at 54.
36 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
17 See id. at 606-07; see also Lushing, TestimonialImmunity and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination:A Study in Isomorphism, 73 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1690, 1705
(1982) (the Freed Court "retreated from ... [the Marchetti Court's] ringing rejection of a
rigid chronological distinction").
18 See Freed, 401 U.S. at 605-07.
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gerprints on the registration constituted potential self-incrimination regarding his future illegal possession of the firearm. 9 Without rejecting the possibility that certain prospective criminal acts
credibly raise a real and substantial risk of present self-incrimination, courts have limited the Marchetti doctrine to continuous
40
courses of criminal activity.
Prospective criminal acts which are part of a continuing course
of criminal conduct can create a real and substantial danger of
self-incrimination if they represent the same criminal acts as those
committed prior to, or contemporaneously with, the grant of immunity. 41 Additionally, a real and sustantial danger is raised when
a compulsion order forces a witness to reveal a necessary element
of a consummated future crime.42 In the various opinions of the

"

See id. In rejecting the transferees' argument that the statute required self-incrimination as to the future possession, the Court stated that this line of reasoning "assumes the
existence of a periphery of the Self-Incrimination Clause which protects a person against
incrimination not only against past or present transgressions but which supplies insulation
for a career of crime about to be launched. We cannot give the Self-Incrimination Clause
such an expansive interpretation." Id. at 606-07. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
stated that the transferees were sufficiently protected against charges of future illegal possession of a firearm because possession constitutes a "continuing violation." Id. at 610-11
(Brennan, J., concurring). The violation, therefore, would occur concurrently with the filing
of the registration application and the statute's use immunity provision would insulate the
registration information from law enforcement agencies. Id. at 611 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan also maintained that the fifth amendment privilege would not protect the
registration information from being used in connection with a future criminal act committed
with the firearm. Id. at 611-12 (Brennan, J., concurring).
40 See, e.g., United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128-29 (1980) (narrowly reading
Marchetti as case involving ongoing gambling activity that was likely to continue); United
States v. Quartermain, Drax, 613 F.2d 38, 42-43 (3d Cir.) (for future conduct to create substantial risk of incrimination it must be part of continuing course of criminal conduct), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980); DeSimone v. United States, 423 F.2d 576, 582 (2d Cir.) (fifth
amendment does not protect against different future criminal act), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
842 (1970). The Marchetti Court added, in dictum, that a prospective criminal act entirely
different from the prior course of criminal conduct would necessarily raise an invalid claim
of the privilege. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 54.
41 See Freed,401 U.S. at 611 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated that the
crimes of possession are continuing violations; therefore, the future criminal act was merely
one aspect of the crime committed prior to or concurrent with the grant of immunity. See
id. (Brennan, J., concurring). When the future criminal act represents one aspect of the
overall conspiracy charge, the prospective act is covered by the fifth amendment privilege.
See United States v. Phipps, 600 F. Supp. 830, 831-32 (D. Md. 1985); see also United States
v. Hossbach, 518 F. Supp. 759, 770-71 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (drug conspiracy occurring post-immunity sufficiently interrelated to conspiracy about which defendant testified to raise valid
claim of privilege as to future acts).
42 See Lushing, supra note 37, at 1707-08. In determining whether prospective criminal
acts are entitled to the fifth amendment privilege, the inquiry must focus on whether or not
the information sought would cause the witness to divulge an intent to commit the crime.
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Gallo court discussing the fifth amendment issue, the focal point of
contention was whether or not Miron's immunized testimony and
later conviction related to one and the same continuous course of
criminal activity. 43 While Judge Winter stated that the grand jury

before which Miron testified in 1980 was investigating ongoing
criminal activity, 44 Judge Altimari took the position that RICO vi-

olations, of which Miron was ultimately convicted, are by definition continuing courses of criminal conduct.45 The district court's
finding of fact, however, was that Miron was not engaged in the
criminal activity for which he was eventually convicted at the time
of his immunized testimony.46 Judge Van Graafeiland accepted
these factual findings and noted that no real and substantial danger existed when Miron testified that he might incriminate himself
as to the crimes for which he was eventually convicted.41
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have had numerous opportunities to examine the scope of the privilege in cases of
perjurious immunized testimony. 48 Although the immunity statute
explicitly exempts from its purview situations where the immunized witness commits perjury, 49 courts have analyzed these perjurious acts as prospective crimes outside the scope of the fifth
amendment's protections. 50 The Supreme Court, in United States
See id. When courts examine self-reporting statutes against a claim of fifth amendment
privilege, the deciding factor is usually whether or not a responsive answer would cause the
one reporting to admit an element of a crime. See Comment, "Hollow Ritual[s]". The Fifth
Amendment and Self-Reporting Schemes, 34 UCLA L. REv. 467, 483-84 (1986).
"I See Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1081-82; Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1189 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring); Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1094 n.1 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1081-82.
Id. at 1094 n.1 (Altimari, J., dissenting). However, Judge Altimari presented no particular evidence that Miron was engaged in the same ongoing criminal activity for which he
was convicted at the time he was granted immunity. See id. (Altimari, J., dissenting).
"' See United States v. Gallo, 671 F. Supp. 124, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 859 F.2d
1078 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2428 (1989).
Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1089 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring).
"See, e.g., United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 130 (1980); United States v.
Black, 776 F.2d 1321, 1327 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 822 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970 (1977).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982). The exception allows for the use of the immunized
testimony in a prosecution for perjury in providing such testimony. Id.
8o See Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. at 130. The Apfelbaum Court stated that the fifth amendment privilege could not have attached to the perjurious testimony because at the time of
the grant of immunity the witness could not have been confronted with a substantial risk of
incrimination. See id. at 130-31; see also United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1343-44
(2d Cir.) (perjury not covered by fifth amendment because "immunity does not extend in
futuro"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); United States v. Seltzer, 621 F. Supp. 714, 716-
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v. Apfelbaum, 51 sanctioned the use of the defendant's immunized
testimony in a prosecution for perjury in providing that testimony.

52

The Apfelbaum Court stated that this was a narrow ex-

ception to the general rule of fifth amendment protection for immunized testimony because at the time of the grant of immunity,
the defendant could not have incriminated himself as to the future
crimes.5 3 In factual settings establishing crimes other than perjury,
lower federal courts have applied the principle that a witness' fear
of self-incrimination as to future crimes is necessarily illusory in
cases not involving ongoing criminal activity; hence, the fifth
amendment privilege never arises. 4
SCOPE OF THE USE IMMUNITY STATUTE

The Supreme Court, in Kastigar v. United States,15 recognized that immunity statutes constitute a necessary element in the
efficient enforcement of criminal laws. 56 In upholding section 6002
against a constitutional challenge, the Court declared the statute
17 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (fifth amendment privilege does not extend to future crime of perjury)
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987); United States v. Caron, 551 F. Supp. 662, 671 (E.D. Va.
1982) (same), aff'd without opinion, 722 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1103 (1984). The legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress believed the explicit exception for perjury was probably unnecessary because it was subsumed in the rest of
the statute. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1969) [hereinafter S. REP.]. It is
submitted that Congress realized that perjury following the grant of immunity represents a
future crime not covered by the fifth amendment and, therefore, would not be protected by
the statute.
445 U.S. 115 (1980).
52 See id. at 130.
' See id. at 127-132.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Brimberry, 779 F.2d 1339, 1346-47 (8th Cir. 1985) (charges
of improperly concealing assets after grant of immunity); United States v. Flores, 753 F.2d
1499, 1501-03 (9th Cir. 1985) (shipping firearms without registering them represents future
crime at time of registration); United States v. Phipps, 600 F. Supp. 830, 831 (D. Md. 1985)
(threatening prosecution witness after giving immunized testimony). The court in Phipps
stated that: "[I]n all but a few exceptional and rare cases, the Fifth Amendment does not
immunize a witness from the use of his testimony in a prosecution for an act committed
subsequent to the date of the testimony." Id.
" 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
56 See id. at 447; see also supra note 3. Several commentators have praised the value of
the present use immunity statute in aiding the efficient enforcement of criminal laws. See,
e.g., Humble, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony: Beyond the Fifth Amendment,
66 TEx. L. REv. 351, 352 (1987) ("[C]ompulsion orders are essential in white collar conspiracy cases"); Thornburgh, Reconciling Effective Federal Prosecutionand the Fifth Amendment: "Criminal Coddling," "The New Torture" or "A Rational Accommodation?", 67 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155, 158 (1976) (present use immunity statute has provided a more
effective method of criminal prosecution).
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was coextensive with, but no broader than, the fifth amendment
privilege.5 7 The legislative history of the use immunity statute
clearly exhibits an intent to limit the protection afforded an immunized witness to the scope of the fifth amendment privilege. 8 Congress adopted the statute for the stated purpose of enhancing evidence gathering procedures in the battle against organized crime.59
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute as proscribing
any and all use of compelled testimony presupposes a valid assertion of the fifth amendment privilege.60 The legislative history of
the statute also assumes a proper assertion of the privilege.6 Since
Judge Winter and Judge Altimari believed that the defendant in
Gallo was engaged in a continuous course of criminal conduct, they
concluded that he had validly asserted his fifth amendment privilege, thereby entitling him to the protection of the immunity
statute.2
Under a quite different analysis, Judge Van Graafeiland
echoed the district court's finding that Miron's crimes represented
prospective acts, but he believed that the fifth amendment attached to Miron's 1980 testimony solely because it was given under
a grant of immunity. 3 This reasoning, however, appears to be in57 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 452-53. Since the statute proscribes the use of the compelled testimony in "any" way, it sufficiently supplants the privilege. See id.
5sSee H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 42; S. REP., supra note 50, at 145. The Judiciary
Committee Reports from both houses of Congress described the grant of use immunity as
being "as broad as, but no broader than, the privilege against self-incrimination." H.R. REP.,
supra note 7, at 42; S. REP., supra note 50, at 145. Implicit in these reports is the desire of
Congress to strike from the criminal procedure law overextensive grants of transactional
immunity. See H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 42; S. REP., supra note 50, at 145. The Supreme
Court has accepted this as the intent of Congress. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459
U.S. 248, 253-54 n.8 (1983) (Congress sought to make grant of immunity less expansive and
no broader than fifth amendment); Kastigar,406 U.S. at 452 n.36 (same) (citing NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS OF THE COMMISSION
1446 (1970)); see also Humble, supra note 56, at 359-60 (Congress adopted reasoning of
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), and streamlined grant of immunity to
breadth of privilege).
See H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 1. In a message from President Nixon to Congress
recommending adoption of the new use immunity statute, the President stated: "With this
new law, government should be better able to strike at the leadership of organized crime
and not just the rank and file." Special Message to Congress on a Program to Combat Organized Crime in America, PUBLIC PAPERS OF RICHARD NIxON 315, 319 (Apr. 23, 1969).
60 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 452-53. It is submitted that absent a real and appreciable
danger required to raise the privilege, the statute affords no protection.
" See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
62 See Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1082; id. at 1094 n.1 (Altimari J. dissenting).
63 See Id. at 1089 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring). Judge Van Graafeiland stated that
"since the testimony was given under a grant of immunity, it is entitled to Fifth Amend-
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verse and an improper reading of Supreme Court precedent.6 4 It is
submitted that while a valid fifth amendment claim is a prerequisite to the protection of the immunity statute, a naked grant of
immunity is insufficient to raise the fifth amendment protection. It
is further submitted that the fifth amendment privilege never
arose with respect to the subsequent use of Miron's prior immunized testimony and therefore the protection of the immunity statute should have been deemed inapplicable. By failing to limit definitively the breadth of the immunity statute, it is suggested that
the Second Circuit sanctioned overbroad protection for grants of
immunity in the future, thereby raising the specter of judicially65
created transactional immunity.
HARMLESS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR

The doctrine of harmless error originated in response to the
tendency of appellate courts to reverse otherwise valid judgments
on the basis of trivial errors.6 These courts were stigmatized as
"impregnable citadels of technicality. 6e Notwithstanding the fall
of the citadel through the development of the harmless-error docment protection." Id. (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) (citing Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S.
449, 474-75 (1975) (White, J., concurring)).
" See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 474-75 (1975) (White, J., concurring). Justice
White argued that if a witness is compelled to testify without immunity because a trial
judge does not believe that the testimony will be incriminating, the witness does not waive
his claim to fifth amendment protection. See id. (White, J., concurring). If, after the witness
testifies, it becomes apparent that the testimony is self-incriminating, the fifth amendment
mandates that this testimony be immunized. See id. (White, J., concurring). Justice White
was referring to a situation where after the testimony is given it becomes apparent that at
the time of the compulsion the testimony was self-incriminatory. See id. (White, J., concurring). Thus, the situation in Maness may be distinguished from that of Gallo where, at the
time of compulsion, Miron's testimony was in no way self-incriminatory. See Gallo, 859 F.2d
at 1089 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring). It is submitted, therefore, that merely granting
immunity does not create a fifth amendment privilege where none existed ab initio.
5 See Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 Tsx. L. REv. 791,
832-34 (1978). Professor Strachan suggests that a grant of use immunity potentially provides a witness with broader protection than a grant of transactional immunity. See id.; see
also Lushing, supra note 37, at 1737. The author proposes a reworded use immunity statute
definitively limiting the scope of immunity to the extent of the privilege. Id. It is suggested
that a proper reading of the present statute and relevant Supreme Court cases obviates the
need for drafting such a statute.
11 See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6, at 995 (1985); R. TRAYNOR,
THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 3-4 (1970). In 1880, for example, the California Supreme
Court reversed an otherwise valid verdict because the word "larceny" was misspelled in the
indictment. See People v. St. Clair, 56 Cal. 406, 407 (1880).
'7 Kavanagh, Improvement of Administrationof CriminalJustice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925).
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trine, 8 constitutional violations continued to be treated as per se
prejudicial.69 Eventually, however, the Supreme Court recognized
that certain constitutional
violations might be subject to a harm70
less-error analysis.

This harmless constitutional error theory has been the subject
of considerable criticism. 1 Some critics have expressed concern
that the Supreme Court has failed to establish lucid standards for
harmless constitutional error review, 72 while others have condemned the eagerness with which many courts apply the doctrine.73 Two justifications have been advanced for limiting the ap" See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 66, at 4-17. The development of harmless-error analysis
led to the enactment of numerous harmless-error statutes. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982)
(harmless-error statute applicable to all cases in all federal courts); CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 960,
1258, 1404 (West 1956) (California harmless-error statute applicable to criminal cases).
19 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961) ("[W]hen one pleads to a
capital charge without benefit of counsel, we do not stop to determine whether prejudice
resulted"); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958) (improper admission of coerced confession per se prejudicial). A tacit assumption of per se prejudice existed as to constitutional
errors. W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 66, § 26.6, at 1000. Justice Frankfurter once
stated that harmless-error statutes were "intended to prevent matters concerned with the
mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and minutiae of procedure from touching
the merits of a verdict." Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).
70 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). The Chapman Court stated that
some violations of a defendant's constitutional rights may be considered harmless, but
found that the violation in this particular case was not harmless to these defendants. Id. at
21-22, 24-26. The Court announced as a standard for determining harmlessness, "whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to
the conviction." Id. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).
7' See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., R. TRAYNOR, supra note 66, at 43-49 (unclear whether appellate court's level
of scrutiny must be beyond a reasonable doubt or some lesser standard); Field, Assessing
the Harmlessness of Federal ConstitutionalError- A Process in Need of a Rationale,125
U. PA. L. REV. 15, 16 (1976) (identifying three of the approaches appearing in Supreme
Court opinions upon which constitutional harmless-error analysis may proceed); Saltzburg,
The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 1014-18 (1973) (noting inability of Supreme Court to apply single standard in harmless constitutional error review).
7 See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 586, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3110-12 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens argued that the Court, in Chapman, merely recognized that
certain constitutional errors were subject to harmless-error analysis, and was not overruling
the presumption of prejudice for constitutional errors. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). He
criticized the majority in Rose for creating a presumption in favor of harmlessness for constitutional violations. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 538, 539-40 (1979) (abuse of harmlesserror doctrine has led to lack of circumspection by courts in its application); Comment, The
Harmless ConstitutionalErrorRule in Washington: What It Was, What It Is, and What It
Should Be, 20 GoNz. L. REV. 429, 477 (1984/85) (harmless constitutional error rule, narrow
at its inception, "has expanded.., into a doctrine which threatens ... [the] subtle erosion
of constitutional procedural rights of criminally accused").
One commentator has gone so far as to suggest purging the harmless error doctrine
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plication of harmless constitutional error analysis: first, that it
promotes misconduct by prosecutors in the belief that any violation of the defendant's constitutional rights may be deemed harmless; 4 and second, that it inhibits the development of important
constitutional issues by giving judges an alternative to deciding
constitutional questions.7 5 Although a wealth of precedent has accumulated supporting the harmless constitutional error analysis, 6
it is suggested that such an analysis should never be applied to
violations of constitutional guarantees which affect fundamental
precepts of our jurisprudence and call into question the integrity
of the judicial process. 77 It is further suggested that disregarding
completely from our constitutional jurisprudence. See Goldberg, Constitutional Sneak
Thief, 71 J. CRI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 421-22 (1980).

7' See Goldberg, supra note 73, at 438-39. Professor Goldberg argued that the proliferation of harmless constitutional errors increases courtroom misconduct (intentional or otherwise) because of the existence of precedent finding the error harmless. See id.; see also
Comment, Harmless Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOL-

457, 458 (1983) (increased application of harmless-error rule to any violation promotes
courtroom misconduct). Professor Goldberg has stated that an inherent irony exists in the
harmless constitutional error doctrine. See Goldberg, supra note 73, at 440-41. The original
purpose of the harmless-error doctrine was to promote judicial economy. Id. However, this
doctrine encourages courtroom misconduct in hopes that any error will be deemed harmless.
See id. Such misconduct will inevitably result in an appeal, and, if the appellate court
should decide that the violation was not harmless, an additional trial will be required. See
id.
7' See Goldberg, supra note 73, at 434-36; see also Field, supra note 72, at 20 (declaring
a constitutional right subject to harmless-error rule threatens existence of that constitutional guarantee).
71 See, e.g., Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118-19 (1983) (ex parte communication between judge and juror violation of right to counsel but subject to harmless error analysis);
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983) (mention of defendant's failure to
testify violation of fifth amendment privilege but subject to rule of harmless error);
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-31 (1972) (admission of inculpatory statement by
non-testifying co-defendant violation of confrontation clause but subject to harmless error
analysis).
77 See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that some constitutional guarantees "are so fundamental that they infect the
validity of the underlying judgment itself, or the integrity of the process by which that
judgment was obtained." Id. at 544 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concluded that
these types of violations require a remedy. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In another opinion,
Justice Stevens listed certain areas where harmless error analysis should never be applied,
one being "when an independent value besides reliability of the outcome suggests that such
analysis is inappropriate." United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 474 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has held, in a plurality opinion, that "discrimination in the
[selection of a] grand jury undermines the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself,
and is not amenable to harmless error review." Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64
(1986); see also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1979) (discrimination in grand jury
selection requires automatic reversal). Some commentators have espoused the view that cerOGY
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the protection of a proper grant of immunity adversely impacts on
the integrity of the judicial process by allowing law enforcement
agents to double-talk a witness into incriminating himself.
The Supreme Court, in Kastigar,held that the invocation of
the fifth amendment guarantees that compelled testimony will not
be used against the witness in any manner. 78 The Court established an exacting standard for prosecutors, requiring proof that
any evidence sought to be used in a subsequent prosecution must
be from wholly independent and legitimate sources. 79 Upon examination of the policies which undergird the fifth amendment,8 0 it
becomes apparent that a harmless-error analysis applied to this
type of violation would derogate the integrity and propriety of the
judicial system." It is submitted that the Gallo majority's consensus on the harmless constitutional error issue provides an impetus
for a broad expansion of this potentially insidious doctrine.

CONCLUSION

The Gallo court failed to define properly the scope of the fifth
amendment and streamline the protection of the use immunity
statute, thereby thwarting the congressional intent underlying the
statute. Furthermore, the court detracted from the value of the
privilege by subjecting it to a harmless-error analysis. While a
tain constitutional guarantees which do not directly affect the fact finding process must
nevertheless be insulated from harmless-error review, lest they be vitiated. See, e.g., Field,
supra note 72, at 19-21 ("That one could reach a conclusion of harmlessness does not necessarily argue for repeal of the rule"); Mause, Harmless ConstitutionalError: The Implications of Chapmanv. California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519, 547-48 (1969) (advocating automatic
reversal for errors which affect integrity of process).
78 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
Id. at 460.
1OSee supra note 2.

79

81See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). Some of the key policy
considerations underlying the fifth amendment are privacy, the preference for an accusatorial system, and the idea that the prosecution must be put to its proof. Id. It has been stated
that the fifth amendment does not increase the reliability of the truth seeking function but
"stands in the Constitution for entirely independent reasons." Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,
375, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2995 (1986). Professor Field has asserted that if these types of constitutional guarantees are subjected to a harmless-error rule analysis, they will eventually be
engulfed by it. See Field, supra note 72, at 20. In his dissenting opinion in Gallo, Judge
Altimari stated that once prosecutors are allowed to breach grants of immunity "the constitutional privilege will have been sacrificed." Gallo, 859 F.2d at 1095 (Altimari, J.,
dissenting).
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baseless assertion of the fifth amendment should afford an immunized witness no protection, a proper assertion of the privilege
must be zealously guarded and never dismissed as harmless.
Paul A. Murphy

